Written on 25th July, 2014 in Python, and Email.

A Python library (from Mailgun) to extract message quotations and signatures.


>>> from talon.signature.bruteforce import extract_signature
>>> message = """Awesome.
... ---
... Myles Braithwaite"""
>>> text, signature = extract_signature(message)
>>> print text
>>> print signature
Myles Braithwaite

Written on 3rd July, 2014 in CASL.

Yet Faber’s initial experience is precisely what one might expect: as companies shift to opt-in lists with customers who explicitly consent to receive messages, they are more likely to open the emails and to click on the links. I asked Faber about the experience to date and he indicated that the company‚Äôs list has unsurprisingly slimmed down, but that it is much more qualified, will grow back over time, and offers a more engaged audience, which he prefers.

The Benefits of Consent by Michael Geist.

Written on 25th June, 2014 in API, Gmail, Google, and IMAP.

Interesting move by Google.

The idea of plugging into email contents is not new, and many outside applications already leverage mail if users allow it. But Google is creating a new application programming interface, or API, to make it easier for outside developers to plug in. It will replace IMAP, a common but complex way for applications to communicate with most email services, limiting the number of apps that can work with Gmail. Google Opens Gmail, Making It More of a Platform for Developers by Alistair Barr and Rolfe Winkler for The Wall Street Journal.

Written on 18th June, 2014 in TrueCrypt.

I am sorry, but I think what you’re asking for here is impossible. I don’t feel that forking truecrypt would be a good idea, a complete rewrite was something we wanted to do for a while. I believe that starting from scratch wouldn’t require much more work than actually learning and understanding all of truecrypts current codebase.

I have no problem with the source code being used as reference.

Anonymous Source

(via Hacker News)

Written on 30th May, 2014 in TrueCrypt.

Phase II of the security audit was already scheduled to commence when Wednesday’s bombshell advisory dropped on the TrueCrypt SourceForge page. After 24 hours to reflect on the unexpected move, an organizer with the Open Crypto Audit Project said he saw no reason to scrub those plans. Online fundraisers to bankroll the project have raised about $70,000, well past the $25,000 organizers had initially aimed for.

We have conferred and we are firmly going forward on schedule with the audit regardless of yesterday’s circumstances,” Kenn White, a North Carolina-based computer scientist and audit organizer told Ars Thursday. “We don’t want there to remain all sorts of questions or scenarios or what ifs in people’s minds. TrueCrypt has been around for 10 years and it’s never received a proper formal security analysis. People are going to continue to use it for better or worse, and we feel like we owe the community the proper analysis.”

TrueCrypt security audit presses on, despite developers jumping ship by Dan Goodin for Ars Technica.

Written on 30th May, 2014 in TrueCrypt.

I don’t think this will be the first, “let’s make sure TrueCrypt wont die”, projects. But at least it’s a place to host the existing software. From what I have gathered online the MD5 and SHA1 sums are:

  • TrueCrypt Setup 7.1a.exe:
    • SHA1: 7689d038c76bd1df695d295c026961e50e4a62ea
    • MD5: 7a23ac83a0856c352025a6f7c9cc1526
  • TrueCrypt 7.1a Mac OS X.dmg:
    • SHA1: 16e6d7675d63fba9bb75a9983397e3fb610459a1
    • MD5: 89affdc42966ae5739f673ba5fb4b7c5
  • truecrypt-7.1a-linux-x86.tar.gz
    • SHA1: 0e77b220dbbc6f14101f3f913966f2c818b0f588
    • MD5: 09355fb2e43cf51697a15421816899be
  • truecrypt-7.1a-linux-x64.tar.gz
    • SHA1: 086cf24fad36c2c99a6ac32774833c74091acc4d
    • MD5: bb355096348383987447151eecd6dc0e